NAME

       sipd - simulate the spatial iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

SYNOPSIS

       sipd -help
         or
       sipd   [-width integer] [-height integer] [-steps integer]
              [-rounds integer] [-seed integer] [-CC double] [-CD
              double]  [-DC  double] [-DD double] [-Iallc double]
              [-Itft  double]  [-Irand  double]  [-Ipav   double]
              [-Ialld   double]  [-rcp  double]  [-noise  double]
              [-mute  double]  [-stats]  [-inv]  [-mag   integer]
              [-term string]

DESCRIPTION

       The  spatial  iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is simulated and
       plotted over time according to the  specified  parameters.
       Each  cell in a grid plays a specific strategy against its
       eight neighbors for several rounds.  At  the  end  of  the
       last round, each cell copies the strategy of its most suc-
       cesful neighbor, which is then  used  for  the  next  time
       step.   Possible  strategies  include  'Always Cooperate,'
       'Always Defect,'

OPTIONS

       -width integer
              Width of world.

       -height integer
              Height of world.

       -steps integer
              Number of steps to simulate.

       -rounds integer
              Number of rounds per step.

       -seed integer
              Random seed for initial state.

       -CC double
              Reward Payoff.

       -CD double
              Sucker Payoff.

       -DC double
              Temptation Payoff.

       -DD double
              Punish Payoff.

       -Iallc double
              Initial population of All-C.

       -Itft double
              Initial population of TFT.

       -Irand double
              Initial population of Random.

       -Ipav double
              Initial population of Pavlov.

       -Ialld double
              Initial population of All-D.

       -rcp double
              Probability of C for Random strategy.

       -noise double
              Probability of noise.

       -mute double
              Probability of mutation.

       -stats Print statistics?

       -inv   Invert all colors?

       -mag integer
              Magnification factor.

       -term string
              How to plot points.

PAYOFFS

       The payoff matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma game is  usu-
       ally expressed as:
                                 Player B's Move
                            +-----------+-----------+
            Player A's Move | cooperate |  defect   |
                +-----------+-----------+-----------+
                | cooperate |  CC, CC   |  CD, DC   |
                +-----------+-----------+-----------+
                |    defect |  DC, CD   |  DD, DD   |
                +-----------+-----------+-----------+

       where  the  table entries are (A's payoff, B's payoff) and
       CC, CD, DC, and DD are the reward, sucker, temptation, and
       punish payoffs, respectively.  For each of these four out-
       comes you will probably want the payoffs  to  reflect  the
       relationships:

            (DC > CC > DD > CD) and ((CD + DC) / 2 < CC).

MISCELLANY

       The  option for the probability of mutation (-mute) corre-
       sponds to the act of a cell spontaneously  changing  to  a

       randomly  selected  strategy independent of the outcome of
       the most recent set of rounds.

       random noise (via the -noise option) manifests itself as a
       cell  making  a  randomly selected move in a single round.
       In this case, both the cell whose action  was  altered  as
       well  as  that cell's opponents "remember" what the random
       move was on the next round.

       The value supplied with the -term option may be "none," in
       which case no graphic output is performed.  This is useful
       if you simply want the statistics  to  be  calculated  for
       each time step (via the -stats option).

       The  initial  population levels for all strategies will be
       normalized, so the scaling of the option values is irrele-
       vant.

BUGS

       No  sanity  checks  are performed to make sure that any of
       the options make sense.

AUTHOR

       Copyright (c) 1997, Gary William Flake.

       Permission granted for any use according to  the  standard
       GNU ``copyleft'' agreement provided that the author's com-
       ments are neither modified nor removed.   No  warranty  is
       given or implied.